

## Message Text

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ACTION NEA-16

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 IO-14 ISO-00 FEA-02 ACDA-19 CIAE-00

INR-11 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-07 RSC-01 SCI-06 AID-20 DRC-01

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R 060845Z SEP 74

FM USMISSION IAEA VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5017

INFO AEC GERMANTOWN

AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 IAEA VIENNA 7718

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: TECH, PARM, IN, US

SUBJECT: NUCLEAR TRAINING FOR INDIANS

REF: STATE 193306

1. MISSION HAS TWO QUESTIONS REGARDING INTERPRETATION OF GUIDELINES CITED REFTEL. FIRST CONCERNS PHRASE QTE US ATOMIC ENERGY FACILITIES UNQTE; IS THERE AN EXACT DEFINITION ANYWHERE, WHICH WE CAN CITE IF ASKED, OF WHAT CONSTITUTES A US ATOMIC ENERGY FACILITY, I.E., USG-OWNED, USG-CONTRACTOR, USAEC LICENSEE OR ANY FACILITY, E.G., A UNIVERSITY, IN THE US WHICH DEALS WITH NUCLEAR ENERGY. NATURE OF DEFINITION OF THIS PHRASE COULD MARKEDLY EXPAND OR RESTRICT TRAINING OPPORTUNITIES OFFERED TO INDIANS THROUGH IAEA, AND MISSION CONFIDENTLY EXPECTS THAT THIS WILL BE FIRST QUESTION WE RECEIVE, FROM OTHER GOVERNMENTS AND FROM AGENCY SECRETARIAT, AT SUCH TIME AS WE INFORM THEM OF THESE GUIDELINES. IDEALLY, WE WOULD APPRECIATE DEFINITION WITH EXACT CITATION OF LEGISLATIVE OR REGULATORY (CFR  
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OR OTHER APPROPRIATE REGULATIONS) BASIS, BUT IF THIS DOES

NOT RPT NOT EXIST, WE WOULD APPRICIATE SOME STATEMENT WHICH COULD BE CITED, AT LEAST ON INFORMAL BASIS, OF HOW USG AGENCIES INVOLVED IN CLEARANCE PROCESS CURRENTLY INTEND TO INTERPRET THIS PHRASE.

2. SECOND, AS WAS INDICATED IAEA VIENNA 7510 (NOTAL), MISSION HAS BEEN GRAPPLING FOR SOME TIME, IN COURSE OF ONGOING REVIEW OF POTENTIAL PROLIFERATION IMPLICATIONS OF VARIOUS AGENCY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS AND MEASURES WHICH MIGHT BE TAKEN THEREON, WITH QUESTION OF EXACTLY WHAT CONSTITUTES A QTE SENSITIVE FIELD UNQTE IN THIS CONTEXT. SOME FIELDS, SUCH AS THOSE CITED IN EXEMPLARY DEFINITIONS

REFTEL, ARE QUITE OBVIOUS, BUT THERE IS ALSO CONSIDERABLE GREY AREA INCLUDING SUCH IMPORTANT SUBJECTS AS: URANIUM MINING AND PROCESSING; FUEL FABRICATION OF NATURAL OR ENRICHED URANIUM FUEL ELEMENTS; GENERAL SUBJECT OF REACTOR TECHNOLOGY INCLUDING DESIGN, REACTOR METALLURGY, OPERATION; LABORATORY OR ACADEMIC STUDIES OF NUCLEAR CHEMISTRY OR PHYSICS WHICH HAVE AN INDIRECT, BUT NOT NECESSARILY A DIRECT, RELATIONSHIP TO HANDLING AND USE OF MATERIALS WHICH WOULD BE INCORPORATED IN NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES. SOME OF THESE AREAS MIGHT BE CONSIDERED ACCEPTABLE IN ANY EVENT, WHILE SOME MIGHT ONLY BE ACCEPTABLE (AS IN CASE OF AREAS SUCH AS CHEMICAL REPROCESSING NOW COVERED BY 10 CFR 110) IN EVENT ADEQUATE SAFEGUARDS WERE APPLIED, I.E., IF RECIPIENT WERE PARTY TO NPT. WHILE MISSION ANTICIPATES THAT AGENCY (AND PROBABLY OTHER SUPPLIER STATES INFORMED OF NEW GUIDELINES) MAY RAISE THIS QUESTION, WE DO NOT RPT NOT RECOMMEND THAT WE ATTEMPT TO INDICATE OUR INTERPRETATION OF THIS PHRASE TO AGENCY ON OTHER THAN OPERATIONS BASIS (I.E, SEE WHICH APPLICATIONS ARE REJECTED OVER A PERIOD OF TIME AND DECIDE FOR ITSELF) UNLESS AND UNTIL WE HAVE A FULLY-AGREED DEFINITION FOR USG USE WHICH PREFERABLY WOULD BE SHARED BY OTHER SUPPLIERS AS WELL. HOWEVER, THIS QUESTION APPEARS TO US TO BE ONE WHICH WILL OBVIOUSLY COME UP IN VERY SHORT ORDER FOR CONSIDERATION BY WHATEVER NEW EXPEORTERS' GROUP TAKES FORM TO SUCCEED ZANGGER COMMITTEE, AND IT WILL BE RELEVANT AS WELL WHEN AND IF USG WISHES TO CONSIDER FURTHER ACTIONS

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WITHIN AGENCY RELATING TO OTHER POTENTIAL PROLIFERATION IMPLICATIONS OF AGENCY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS. ACCORDINGLY, IT WOULD BE EXTREMELY USEFUL FOR MISSION TO HAVE SOME IDEA OF CURRENT STATE OF THINKING OF INTERESTED USG OFFICES ON THIS POINT, AND IN EVENT THERE IS NO AGREED EXACT DEFINITION WHICH COULD BE SUPPLIED BY CABLE AT PRESENT, WE SUGGEST THAT APPROPRIATE MEMBERS OF USDEL TO 18TH IAEA GC COME TO VEINNA NEXT WEEK PREPARED TO

DISCUSS MATTER WITH MISSION STAFF.

3. MORE IMMEDIATELY, MISSION HAS NOT RPT NOT YET INFORMED AGENCY SECRETARIAT OF THESE GUIDELINES AND DOES NOT RPT NOT PROPOSE TO DO SO FOR ABOUT 2-3 WEEKS AT MINIMUM. WE FIND IT LESS THAN CREDIBLE FOR US TO ASSUME THAT ANYONE IN THE AGENCY (UNLESS TOLD ON PERSONAL BASIS AND ON SUCH DEEP BACKGROUND THAT INFORMATION WOULD BE OF LITTLE OR NO OPERATIONAL USE TO SECRETARIAT) COULD BE APPRISED OF THESE GUIDELINES WITHOUT WORD GETTING BACK TO INDIANS, PROBABLY SOONER RATHER THAN LATER (SINCE INDIAN APPLICANTS COME TO AGENCY IN CONSTANT STREAM, AND AGENCY WOULD PRESUMABLY REFER AT LEAST OBLIQUELY TO THIS GUIDANCE AT SOME POINT.) FROM DEPARTMENT'S INJUNCTION TO EMBASSY NEW DELHI THAT GUIDELINES ARE NOT RPT NOT TO BE PASSED TO INDIANS, WE ASSUME THAT THEY WOULD FIRST HEAR OF THEM THROUGH AGENCY. AS DEPT AWARE, BOARD OF GOVERNORS MEETING ON 9/13, AND GENERAL CONFERENCE ON 9/16-23, WILL BE CONSIDERING SEVERAL ISSUES WITH SOME SENSITIVITY ON PROLIFERATION ISSUE (E.G., ARGENTINE SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT), AND ALSO SEVERAL ISSUES RANGING FROM HIGH NUISANCE VALUE (FINANCING OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE) TO VERY GREAT

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 IAEA VIENNA 7718

INTRINSIC IMPORTANCE TO US (REDUCTION OF US RATE OF ASSESSMENT). IF INDIA SET OUT TO DO SO, IT COULD RAISE CONSIDERABLE TROUBLE FOR US ON THESE ISSUES AND WE CONSIDER THAT THEIR FINDING OUT ABOUT THESE GUIDELINES INDIRECTLY THROUGH SECRETARIAT WOULD BE QUITE LIKELY TO ANTAGONIZE THEM ENOUGH TO CAUSE THEM TO GO OUT OF THEIR WAY TO MAKE TROUBLE. THIS REASON FOR DELAY WILL OPERATE ONLY THROUGH CLOSE OF GC; WE DO NOT RPT NOT RECOMMEND INDEFINITELY AVOIDING INFORMING AGENCY, AND PROPOSE TO DO SO AT APPROPRIATE TIME AFTER GC AND AFTER WE ARE SURE THAT OTHER POTENTIAL SUPPLIERS ARE AWARE OF US GUIDELINES IN THIS REGARD AND, HOPEFULLY, HAVE SIGNALLED SOME WILLINGNESS NOT TO AVIDLY SNAP UP US REJECTS.

4. FURTHER, AGENCY RECENTLY RECEIVED FORMAL REJECTIONS OF FOUR INDIAN APPLICATIONS FOR TRAINING IN US, AND RESULT WAS PROMPT SERIES OF THREE ORAL QUERIES TO MISSION FROM CHIEF OF FELLOWSHIP AND TRAINING SECTION (HAMMOND, US) ACTING DIRECTOR OF TA DIVISION (LLOYD, UK) AND DDG FOR TA AND PUBLICATIONS (GOSWAMI, INDIA) AS TO WHETHER THIS WAS REFLECTION OF CONSCIOUS US POLICY OR NOT. MISSION CONFIDENTIAL

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PLEADED IGNORANCE ON THIS POINT, OBSERVING THAT IT WAS PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE THAT US POLICY ON IMPLICATIONS OF INDIAN NUCLEAR EXPLOSION WAS UNDERGOING CONTINUING REVIEW AND THAT WE FELT IT LIKELY THAT US OFFICIALS CONCERNED WERE UNWILLING TO DO ANYTHING WHICH MIGHT TEND TO ANTICIPATE OR PREJUDGE RESULTS OF THAR REVIEW, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME OBSERVING THAT, AS AGENCY AWARE, IT WAS SOMETIMES SIMPLY IMPOSSIBLE TO ARRANGE TRAINING IN US IN CERTAIN FIELDS AND THAT THIS MIGHT ALSO HAVE ENTERED INTO PICTURE. MISSION FELT, AND STILL FEELS, THAT THESE QUERIES WERE ORIGINATED WITHIN SECRETARIAT ITSELF, BUT SEES OUTSIDE POSSIBILITY THAT THEY COULD HAVE BEEN INSTIGATED BY INDIAN MISSION THROUGH GOSWAMI. IF LATTER WAS ACTUALLY CASE, IT IS INTERESTING SIGNAL OF MORE INTENSE INDIAN AWARENESS OF THIS ASPECT THAN WE HAD SUSPECTED, AND IT ALSO MEANS WE COULD RELY ON INDIAN MISSION BEING INFORMED OF GUIDELINES IN VERY SHORT ORDER.

5. FOR FOREGOING REASONS, MISSION INTENDS UNLESS ADVISED OTHERWISE TO REFRAIN FROM INFORMING AGENCY UNTIL AFTER END OF GC (PROBABLY LATE SEPTEMBER OR EARLY OCTOBER. IN INTERIM, WE PROPOSE TO DISCUSS MATTER, IN CONFIDENCE, WITH UK, FRG AND CANADIAN MISSIONS BASED ON FACT THAT THEIR GOVERNMENTS ARE ALREADY AWARE OF SUBJECT AND THAT APPROPRIATE OFFICIALS WILL PROBABLY BE IN VIENNA FOR GC.

FURTHER, MISSION SUGGESTS THAT DEPT. CONSIDER AUTHORIZING  
MISSION TO DISCUSS MATTER, AT APPROPRIATE TIME SUBSEQUENT  
TO END OF GC, WITH OTHERS WHO HAVE EXCHANGED NOTES WITH  
USG IN ZANGGER COMMITTEE EXERCISE AND WHO WILL PRESUMABLY  
THEREFOR FORM NUCLEUS OF WHATEVER NEW CONSULTATIVE  
MECHANISM FOR SUPPLIERS EVOLVES TO SUCCEED ZANGGER  
COMMITTEE AFTER ITS FINAL MEETING ON SEPTEMBER 24.PORTER

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## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 01 JAN 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** POLICIES, PERSONNEL TRAINING, FOREIGN WORKERS, NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS, NUCLEAR COOPERATION PROGRAMS  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 06 SEP 1974  
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**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** golinofr  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
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